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“Mundane Sights of Power: The History of Social Monitoring and its 
Subversion in Rwanda” 
 
Andrea Purdeková 
 
Abstract. By tracing Rwandan state’s “mundane sights” – everyday forms of presence 
and monitoring – the paper sheds light on the historical development and striking 
continuities in ‘interactive surveillance’ across a century of turbulent political change. 
The paper considers three emblematic surveillance technologies— the nyumbakumi 
institution, the identity card, and umuganda works (and public activities more 
broadly)— which, despite their implication in genocide, were retained, reworked and 
even bolstered after the conflict ended. The paper investigates what drives the observed 
continuity and ‘layering’ of social monitoring over time, highlighting the key role 
ambiguity and ambivalence play in this process. The research expands the concept of 
political surveillance, moving away from the unidirectional notion of ‘forms of 
watching,’ and questions any easy distinctions between visibility and invisibility in the 
exercise of power or its subversion.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The story of surveillance is rarely told in reference to Africa. Whilst it does not 
deny limits or subversion of state power, i surveillance is narrated from the angle 
of state presence, rather than absence, the latter of which is the more typical 
frame in political analyses of the continent. The story of surveillance is one that 
foregrounds formal institutions, bureaucracy and administration, systematic 
technologies and their historical roots, thus diverting focus from discussions of 
personalized relations and informal institutions that dominate debates and 
characterisations of African politics (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Bayart 1993, 
Jackson and Rosberg 1982). It connects to literature highlighting state resilience, 
‘state survival’ (e.g. Titeca and deHerdt 2011) and state as a ‘constant frame’ 
(Nugent 2010) even in situations of weakness. The neo-patrimonial paradigm is 
slowly being complemented by studies focused squarely on bureaucracy 
(Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014), surveillance (McGregor 2013, 
Purdeková 2011a, Bozzini 2011), law and regulation (Piccolino 2013; Chalfin 
2008) but more work both contemporary and historical is needed.  
 
Surveillance and control could hardly be more intertwined than in the case of 
Rwanda where accounts of the 1994 genocide highlight state reach and oversight 
(Straus 2006, Mironko 2004, des Forges 1999), and where post-genocide studies 
paint a picture of strong state presence in the space of the everyday (Ingelaere 
2014, Thomson 2013, Purdeková 2011a). Despite its importance, little is 
understood about surveillance in Rwanda historically and conceptually. How has 
surveillance developed over time? Has its intensity and nature changed over 
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time, in which ways, and why? What explains continuities despite appeals to 
(often revolutionary) political change and a ‘break’ with the past by Rwandan 
leaders? What is it about surveillance that allows it to be re-appropriated and 
elaborated time and again, even despite very negative deployment in genocide? 
How unique is Rwanda when set into a broader regional context?  
 
The present paper offers a systematic historical tracing of surveillance in 
Rwanda, narrated through three emblematic technologies: the nyumbakumi local 
state representative (and administrative reach and density more broadly), the ID 
card (and identification, sorting systems more broadly) and finally umuganda 
community works (and responsibilisation and public participation more 
broadly). As will be shown, none of these technologies were in fact unique to 
Rwanda at the time of their inception or after, creating potential for a much 
broader comparative analysis.  
 
The story of continuities and intensification is itself arresting. The paper will 
show that social monitoring developed in ‘thrusts’ rather than continuously, 
following changes in governance modalities and political economy of the state 
itself. Social monitoring is hence best understood through the trope of ‘layering,’ 
whereby technologies are added over time. The paper not only explains the 
intensification, it also reveals striking continuities across time despite appeals to 
change. Interestingly, the Rwandan state of today, when read through the lens 
surveillance, closely resembles its much-maligned predecessor—the 2nd 
Republic (1973- 1990) that ended in genocide.ii Post-genocide ‘reconstruction’ 
nonetheless created its own engine for intensifying social monitoring in new 
ways, as will be explored below.  
 
On a broader theoretical level, the paper shows that discussions of visibility, 
seeing and being seen, are a rich window into understanding power and its 
subversion as they allow us to better grasp their complex and sometimes 
counter-intuitive nature. Whilst visibility is typically understood to be about 
‘ascertaining,’ it is in fact ambiguity and ambivalence surrounding the 
surveillance project that help its replication and redeployment, and it is 
uncertainty and distrust that are its main outcome. On the other hand, as will be 
shown, subversion does not simply mean escaping overseeing but using and 
manipulating visibility. Simple dualities thus break down: Visibility and 
invisibility cannot be easily separated in the exercise of power, and neither can 
revelation and disguise.    
 
2. Surveillance and the African State 
 
Surveillance as an academic topic is invariably bound with Western governance. 
Much less is known about the experiences of former colonies and post-colonial 
states, especially in Africa where the lack of historical analysis is most apparent. 
Exceptions here include Young and Turner’s (1985) work on Zaire’s ‘Seventh 
Scourge- The Security Forces’ or Schatzberg’s (1988) work on ‘The State as Ear,’ 
exploring Zaire’s Centre National de Documentation (CND)— the successor to the 
Belgian colonial Sûreté— and the environment of intimidation and fear it created 
through its local networks of informers. Similarly, Mahmood Mamdani (1983) 
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has explored the operation of the State Research Bureau (SRB) in Idi Amin’s 
Uganda and its effective deployment of informers and intimidation. A small 
trickle of more recent studies turn away from the organs of the state to 
investigate local and everyday manifestations of surveillance at a particular 
historical juncture, from passbooks in apartheid South Africa to checkpoints in 
contemporary Eritrea (Breckenridge 2005a & 2005b, Bozzini 2011, see also 
Purdeková 2011a and McGregor 2013). Despite being few in number, the 
available studies do nonetheless offer a glimpse of the rich field of inquiry that 
remains largely untapped.  
 
But the gap to be closed is conceptual, too. Unlike the works that precede it, the 
present study seeks to understand what drives the layering, intensification, 
redeployment and repurposing of ‘mundane’ surveillance technologies over the 
longue durée.  A number of key questions emerge: How should we theorize 
surveillance in Africa if we want to carry out analysis across epochs, and one that 
does not begin with colonialism, and does not treat surveillance as an ‘import’ 
from the West? What drives the evolution of state surveillance over time? What 
explains continuities in social monitoring across a century of turbulent change, 
and despite experience of major atrocity abetted by it? Finally, how do we make 
sure that by foregrounding systems of ‘capture’ we do not overlook forms of 
escape? 
 
The Rwandan state is unique in the context of Africa not only in terms of its 
control of the periphery, its vertical reach and the density of its structures 
(Purdeková 2015, 2011a; Ingelaere 2014) but also due the essentially indirect 
workings of its political power. Power works through ‘subtle forms of 
intimidation’ (Jessee 2013) and the state’s embedding in the everyday. The 
present paper aims to contribute both to a better understanding of this indirect 
and subtle governance modality, and its development and transformation across 
time. Historical work on the Rwandan state has traced the gradual territorial 
extension of state control and elaboration of complex administrative and 
extractive systems (Vansina 2004, desForges 2011, Newbury 1988, Jefremovas 
2002) placing much emphasis on the transformation and rigidification of ethnic 
identity, and the resulting entrenchment of inequalities, political exclusion and 
conflict over time (Jefremovas 2002, Thomson 2013). While ethnicity remains an 
important frame for understanding Rwanda’s history, this paper shows that 
surveillance might tell us a key story of continuity that cuts across Hutu- and 
Tutsi-dominanted epochs of Rwanda’s political history. 
  
Surveillance might invoke the notion of ‘capture,’ as in being caught up in the 
modes of state care and coercion. Yet existing empirical work (Kelly 2006, 
Jeganathan 2004, Bozzini 2011) qualifies the effectiveness of surveillance in 
reaching, sorting and identifying people. Further conceptual work can help us 
identify its limits. Surveillance here is not understood simply as ‘forms of 
watching’ but rather as a ‘sphere of vision’ where seeing is complemented by 
being seen, and where the latter — whether real or suspected— affects 
performance of those under state watch. ‘Sphere of vision’ here thus differs 
subtly but importantly from Foucault’s ‘sphere of visibility’ (1975). Even as 
Foucault spoke of surveillance’s decentering through individual embodiment of 
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the gaze and the resulting self-directed censure, his approach remains 
fundamentally one-sided. It has been criticized for offering little scope for 
resistance or co-authorship (only inasmuch as one imbibes the gaze). Yet what 
matters in the analysis of ‘mundane sights’ is not simply visibility as the scope 
and ability to oversee, but rather ‘ways of seeing and being seen’ which are their 
defining feature.  
 
This framework is able to better capture the ‘interactive’ technologies that are 
the basis of this study. Interactive surveillance is one that fundamentally 
depends not only on ‘presencing’ of agents of state (or state-aligned or state-
associated actors) but ‘presenting’ of token by those being surveilled, either in 
forms of cards and permits, information for censuses, taxation, displays of loyalty 
or a friendly roster, or attendance at meetings. In all of these interactions, there 
is scope for play and subversion. Yet the frame of interaction also begs some 
fundamental questions: Does interaction imply a balance of powers, 
outmaneuvering and ‘impotence’ (Mbembe 1992), or does the state still hold the 
upper hand? This will be studied through the exactions, duties, and emotive 
states that the Rwandan state is able (or unable) to extract with the help of its 
surveillance technologies. 
 
This conception of surveillance also complicates simple divisions and opposition 
between visibility as capture and invisibility as a site of escape. Seeing does not 
easily translate into knowing. Visibility itself can produce mis-reading and be 
manipulated and subverted, not simply docked. Invisibility, on the other hand, is 
not the exclusive domain of exit and escape. As will be shown, it often combines 
with surveillance itself in the exercise of state power.  States can fudge, 
obfuscate, disappear, and they can reproduce themselves politically or 
economically through such manufacturing of the unseen (see e.g. Newbury 1984 
on Zaire) or the haunting of the ‘missing’.  
 
The framework of ‘mundane’ sights captures the operation of state power in 
Rwanda particularly well but by the same token it diverges from modern 
surveillance studies focused on high-end electronic technologies, databases, 
biometrics, CCTVs and debates of the ‘control society’ or assemblages of vision 
operating across social arenas and geographical borders (Lyon 2007, Haggerty 
and Ericson 2000). The focus here lies squarely on ‘interactive’ technologies of 
surveillance, embedded in the flow of everyday life. Similarly, the focus here is 
not on special sites of surveillance such as the prison or paradigmatic tropes of 
the ‘panopticon’ (Foucault 1975) or ‘banopticon’ (Bigo 2005). Quite the opposite 
– what is of interest is the ‘non-special,’ the mundane and the everyday. Hence 
the chosen focus on local administrative ‘overseeing,’ ID cards and identification, 
and state-mandated public activities as ceremonies of being seen and posing for 
view.  
 
Importantly, though the analysis that follows is anchored in specific 
technologies, the idea of ‘mundane sights’ is meant to capture a broader state of 
being. From a lived perspective, surveillance is a more generalised state and an 
overall effect of state presencing, and it is not reducible to or perceived as a ‘set’ 
of technologies or specific ‘sites.’ Today, Rwanda as ‘surveillance state’ is less a 
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geographic reference or a physical composite than a state of being, a community 
of affect.  
 
The focus on everyday and ‘interactive’ technologies also indicates a very 
particular insertion into debates on African bureaucracy. Rather than looking at 
political economies of African bureaucracies as a whole (Berman 1984, 
Goldsmith 1999, Mamdani 1996, Heussler 1963, Olivier de Sardan 2014, among 
others), I am more interested in investigating ‘daily governance’ (Blundo and 
Meur 2009) and ‘street level bureaucracy’ (Lipsky 1980, in Olivier de Sardan 
2009). The objective is not to unearth genealogies of state institutions in 
Rwanda, such as the security services. The analytical agenda is closer to, though 
not overlapping, with Olivier de Sardan’s call for the study of ‘real daily 
functioning,‘ of ‘states at work’ (2004; 2014). The project is different because it 
does not offer a close-up study of bureaucrats at work. In fact, bureaucracy as a 
term invokes official posts and structures; the term much more appropriate to 
the study of surveillance in Rwanda is apparatus. The paper also focuses on the 
space ‘in-between’ where contact happens and vision gets fuzzy. The paper thus 
both outlines the local apparatus of surveillance, and demonstrates, at least in 
part, its interactive dimension— what and how is actually captured in and 
produced (politically speaking) through the sphere of vision.  
 
Surveillance technology can be put to different uses by the state; hence change in 
surveillance is conceptualised here through the lens of the changing nature, tasks 
and roles of the Rwandan Leta (from l’etat).iii Continuity in surveillance, on the 
other hand, can be traced to the ambiguity that lies at its core. State surveillance 
can be narrated as either beneficial (as reaching to care) or harmful (as 
repression or oppression, as overreach). In the perspective of care, visibility is 
essential. That is why Lancet can speak of a ‘scandal of invisibility’ (Setel et al 
2007): ‘absence of reliable data…is at the root of this scandal, which renders 
most of the world’s poor as unseen, uncountable, and hence uncounted.’ 
Invisibility here is read as a form of structural violence. At the same time, states, 
especially authoritarian states, often care as well as target, and can deploy 
visibility and monitoring as repressive strategies. The paper will show how the 
ambiguity of surveillance has allowed successive Rwandan governments to re-
appropriate this state asset with ever-increasing vigor and despite its 
imbrications in a past of exploitation and violence.  
 
 
3. Overseeing: Administrative Reach and Density 
 
The most striking story of social monitoring in Rwanda begins well before 
colonial rule. The story is one of surveillance as ‘overseeing’ of local life through 
administrative presence. The administrative structures of the Nyiginya kingdom 
(cca 1650- 1961)iv consolidated gradually, increasing both in geographical scope, 
local reach and complexity, and primarily served the purpose of extraction of 
corvée labor, the collection of ikoro— taxes, and cooptation of notables into the 
system through distribution of spheres of control. Historically, both seeing and 
being seen were key principles in the exercise and maintenance of central power. 
Then and now, ‘presencing’ rather than simply ‘overseeing’ has been an 
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important ‘state effect’ (Mitchell 1999), the central state’s feedback loop of 
power. 
 
Importantly, even at the height of pre-colonial expansion, the central court and 
its delegates were hardly ‘all-seeing’ and in many areas visibility was dispersed 
among small islands of control.v While ‘Rwandan royal traditions portray an 
ancient, royal kingdom,’ recent historiography rather focuses on the dynamics of 
patchy authority, gradual expansion, varied resistances and the ‘shifting political 
field of constant negotiation and competing loyalties’ that characterized the 
Rwandan court at the time of European contact (des Forges 2011: xxiii; see also 
Vansina 2004).  
 
The presence of the state was uneven and authority ‘varied from region to 
region, and sometimes hill to hill’ (des Forges 2011:101). The kingdom was 
historically strongest in the central areas of today’s Rwanda, expanded outwards 
through a set of military expeditions, and consolidated control over areas in the 
North only with the help of the European powers in the first decades of the 20th 
century (Vansina 2004, Lemarchand 1966, Des Forges 2011). Full occupation 
was only achieved in 1931 (Reyntjens 1987). 
 
The dynamic and uneven nature of state expansion should not detract from our 
study of administrative innovation and imposition, which were key to the 
successful (if uneven) consolidation of power. The style of centralisation was 
based on direct court appointments of local representatives and overlapping 
authority structures at the local level. The analysis here is then principally 
concerned with reach, density and style of administration and how these have 
evolved over time. This in turn will allow us to assess whether, and if so how, 
post-genocide Rwanda is unique in terms of administrative surveillance of local 
spaces.  
 
In the early 19th century, expansion of the kingdom brought with it the 
development of new administrative norms. A series of three overlapping 
authority structures were established in each district under control – the 
batware (army leaders with powers over conscription and taxation), 
banyabutaka (responsible for land grants), and banyamukenke (responsible for 
pastureland)—all being delegates of the court, suppressing and replacing prior 
authorities— lineage heads or chiefs. The overlap assured a ‘more complete 
court authority’ and in addition, ‘with each delegated authority overseeing the 
actions of his colleagues,’ it also prevented any particular delegate from 
accumulating excessive power (des Forges 2011:7). ‘Below this intermediary 
layer, power was delegated to the hill chiefs. [These] would in turn appoint a 
group of petty functionaries called ibirongozi (from Swahili: supervisors, 
overseers) to act as intermediaries’ (Lemarchand 1966).  
 
The reach of the state was thus intricate. To demonstrate this more clearly, it is 
estimated that before the arrival of the Europeans, there were about 80 district 
authorities, and a total of about 2,000-3,000 hill authorities in what is a rather 
small territory of Rwanda with a population of no more than 1-2 million in 1900. 
While the German colonizers left the pre-colonial administration largely intact, 
 7 
the Belgians aimed for reform (Rumyia 1992). The Belgian administration 
reduced the number of local authorities between 1926-1932 in an attempt to 
simplify administration. Provinces and hills were regrouped and the ‘trinity of 
chiefs’ replaced with a single one. In 1932, there were 1,043 sub-chiefs with 343 
tax-payers on average (Reyntjens 1987:78). In 1948, Rwanda was divided into 
50 chiefdoms and 630 sub-chiefdoms (sous-chefferies) (Codere 1973). 
Biographies of chiefs (abashefu) and hill chiefs (abasoushefu) collected at the 
cusp of independence by Helen Codere show that the population overseen by 
each sub-chief was nonetheless still small. Sous-chef Ruhaniriza reminisces that 
in 1935 he has overseen 550 taxpayers in Nyarure, ‘but that was more than at 
Ngarume where I only had 350 able bodied men [Hommes Adultes Valides]’ 
(Codere 1973:20).  
 
In daily life, it was these lowest authorities— the sub-chiefs and especially the 
ibirongozi or, in popular parlance, umumotsi —that had most presence (Mulinda 
2010: 39). The umumotsi’s ‘popularity’ was clearly expressed in the name itself, 
which derives from the verb kumoka— to bark. Umumotsi was a figure 
associated with orders and obligations—he called for obligatory meetings or 
iperu (a contortion of French appel - summons), collected prestations and taxes, 
called able bodied men to perform compulsory works (ibid). Ruhamiriza, a sous-
chef at Ngarume between 1935 and 1940 describes his tasks: ‘I collected taxes. I 
caused various crops to be cultivated. I assigned corvée work. I traced out roads. 
I did reforesting’ (Codere 1973:58). While sous-chef Gasigwa speaks of his 
‘enormous popularity,’ Mihana is clear that ‘my subjects simply obeyed me out of 
fear. They worked hard but were malcontent’ (ibid: 79). The biographies of sous-
chiefs are filled with stories of local political intrigue and ‘malice,’ appointments 
and reappointments, easier and more difficult constituencies, but also speak 
clearly of a privileged class and an intricate, centralized political organization 
with clear presence in Rwandans’ daily lives. 
 
After independence, the rhetoric of the First Republic spoke of an ‘absolute 
break’ with the past of the ‘feudal-colonial system’ (Desrosiers 2014: 210). But it 
is precisely at this moment, when the political regime and the political class in 
power change profoundly, that continuities in terms of state become especially 
arresting. Despite administrative reform and different political functionaries 
(Hutu replacing most Tutsi), the reach of the state and the styles of its 
appropriation remain largely unchanged. The administrative structure and labor 
requisitioning are kept intact. Based on a decree from 25 December 1959, sub-
chiefdoms become communes (municipalities), and chiefs are replaced by 
burgomasters (mayors). Yet ‘upon assuming power, many burgomasters 
interpreted their role in pre-revolutionary terms’ (Reyntjens 1987: 90) thus 
being complicit in partially restoring the very order they first hoped to destroy 
(Lemarchand 1966:318).  
 
The state reached the pinnacle of intricacy after independence, under the Second 
Republic of Juvenal Habyarimana (1973-1990). The National Republican 
Movement for Democracy (MRND), a single party created in 1975, fused 
completely with state structures (Guichaoua 1989:145). The state was vertically 
integrated and organized hierarchically into prefectures, communes, sectors and 
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cells. The leadership made attempts to decentralize politics and services to the 
commune level, ‘ensuring closer ties between the state and citizens,’ though 
reach was far from perfect (Desrosiers 2014: 204).  
 
Taking inspiration from socialist Tanzania, President Habyarimana instituted the 
nyumbakumi system in Rwanda—an informal system of unpaid authorities 
responsible for 10 houses. In Tanzania, the system was first instituted in 1964 
and the nyumba kumi kumi served multiple purposes, the most important of 
which was checking and reporting on security and movement, collecting party 
dues, and mobilizing the population for development tasks, being in essence the 
lowest arm of the TANU (and later the CCM, Chama Cha Mapinduzi). It was these 
local balozi (lit. ambassadors) that were responsible for compliance with and 
execution of the ujamaa system. They were meant to be ‘the eyes of the nation’ 
(second Vice-President, quoted in Levine 1972: 330). In practice, their loyalties 
were often split and oversight over them imperfect (Cross 2013: 46).  
 
In Rwanda, the function of the nyumbakumi was very similar—it was the lowest 
arm of the MRND, reported on security, movement and mobilized the population, 
which included supervision of umuganda community work. The nyumbakumi 
also had the power to fine people (HRW 1999). The new system had the meant 
effects of greater responsibilisation, greater visibility and compliance, and 
greater presencing of the state in daily life. Nyumbakumi’s intimate knowledge of 
the neighborhood, their tasks and their ability to draw lists contributed to 
Rwandans being ‘eminently findable’ (Scott 2006:215). 
 
The nyumbakumi system poses interesting puzzles. Clearly, it is not unique to 
Rwanda, and so neither is the attempt at deep local state reach and surveillance. 
The nyumbakumi system itself has a longer genealogy, reaching to communist 
countries outside of the continent (Maoist China, Cuba, Cambodia, the latter had 
an equivalent called dop khnongvi) and has in turn inspired more countries in 
Africa than just Rwanda and Tanzania, including Burundi, Uganda, and most 
recently, Kenya. Nonetheless, the nyumbakumi has been always treated as a 
symbol of Rwandan state’s penetrating reach, and the structures were implicated 
in the genocide (Mironko 2004, desForges 1999). So is Rwanda unique in terms 
of reach, and if so, how? 
 
This is where political geography and the long history of local state presence 
comes into play, a legacy that cannot be reduced to the nyumbakumi but rather 
harks back to the umumotsi or the imposed Tutsi sous-chef of colline, a past of 
imposition, vertical integration and intricacy that countries such as Tanzania or 
Uganda do not share with Rwanda. When it comes to the genocide, state 
presence was an indirect contributing factor through the selective impositions 
and harsh extractions that it imposed. The nature of the state also affected the 
execution and form of mobilization during the genocide. The intricate 
hierarchical structure on a small geographical area helped unroll the project, 
again a factor not replicated in the neighboring countries, with the exception of 
Burundi (where the role of the local state structures in the 1972 genocide 
remains to be investigated). 
 
 9 
The second puzzle concerns the continuity of local reach and the nyumbakumi 
institution after the genocide. The same institution aiding mobilization for the 
killing project became key in mobilizing local population for justice after the 
genocide (Nagy 2013:87; Thomson 2013:167). The nyumbakumi have also 
facilitated research into both of these topics (McDoom 2011). Perhaps rather 
than a puzzle, what this represents is the ambiguity at the heart of quotidian 
surveillance and state penetration more broadly. It is not inevitable that 
extraction always hides behind calls to ‘development’ or that repression always 
hides behind calls for increased ‘security.’ The continuous attraction of 
surveillance lies in the belief in its positive potential. People are caught up in the 
state’s modes of both coercion and care. Additionally, from the perspective of a 
government, the seduction of surveillance connects to its ability to ease 
governance. Finally, we know that governments infrequently muster the 
strength to oppose the “inertia of the state” (Stepputat and Hansen 2001: 29). 
 
The powerful ambivalence to state presence was most recently reflected in 
Kenyan public debates surrounding the introduction of the nyumbakumi system. 
The suggestion to replicate the well-known system of local intelligence and 
control came in the wake of the Westgate Mall attacks of September 2013 and 
hence the call for localized security came at the back of profound insecurity. 
Analysis of recent press and blogging activity in 2014 quickly paints a picture of 
ambiguity and ambivalence—while some people post pictures of the Big Brother 
and speak of spies and unwelcome intrusion into private life, others excuse the 
costs as necessary trade-offs to assure greater security. 
 
But while the power of ambiguity is key in upholding and deepening state reach 
and surveillance, this would perhaps be too quick of a dismissal of the topic, 
since in the case of Rwanda the state presence across epochs has been coercive 
and over-bearing, and continually (and more not less so after the genocide) 
excused with references to service provision and security. Both the 
developmental drive and securitisation have augmented after the genocide, 
leading to increasing state presencing and surveillance of daily life.  
 
This is so despite the recent abolition of the nyumbakumivii in 2006 and despite 
the fact that umuganda has been reduced to once-a-month obligation. The new 
lowest official administrative level today—village or umudugudu— is governed 
by an umukuru, who, with a committee of four, is responsible for 50 to 200 
houses. At the next level up (the ‘cell’), the responsable oversees, with a 
committee of seven and 5 Local Defence Forces (LDF) personnel, about 500- 
1000 houses. The number of cells has remained virtually unchanged from before 
the genocide, despite two administrative restructurings in 2001 and 2006. The 
2006 reforms decreased the number of higher-level units – provinces and 
districts— but significantly increased the number of the more localized sector 
offices, from 145 to 415. 
 
Despite the restructuring, and as explored elsewhere (Ingelaere 2014, 
Purdeková 2011a and 2015), state presence has intensified after the genocide, in 
line with the new mode of governance set on wholesale social transformation. 
‘Reconstruction’ in Rwanda has reached far beyond the physical realm as the 
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government asserts itself in attempts to securitise, re-educate and sensitise the 
population, both in the name of its developmental aspirations and in the name of 
its political struggle, to capture the hearts and minds and assure political 
consent. Politics and security interlock, both calling for intensified surveillance. 
In the name of uncovering ‘genocide ideology,’ ‘divisionism’ and ‘terrorists,’ and 
‘preventing’ a future slide to physical violence, the government has tightened 
surveillance of local milieus and uses this oversight to crack down on opposition, 
real or perceived.  
 
Surveillance in today’s Rwanda is a tool of political control and repression to a 
greater extent than previously. The memory of the genocide is used to invoke 
and legitimize the need for greater securitisation of everyday life. In fact, public 
security has become an “all-encompassing indemnifier” (Nyst 2012), excusing 
further empowerment of police, army, and intelligence in Rwanda in their 
information-gathering roles. It has been used to argue in favor of the 2013 
amendment to the 2008 Law Relating to the Interception of Communications, 
which further increases intrusion into private lives and the ability ‘to listen and 
read private communications, both online and offline’ (ibid). All communication 
providers are asked to implement state-acquired technologies such as keyword 
scanning. It is an ‘open secret’ that both email and phone communications in 
Rwanda are tracked. People certainly self-edit as if this were the case.   
 
In the post-genocide era then, the platforms, responsibilities and obligations 
associated with the state have proliferated, in security (amarondo patrols, plain 
clothes police and ad-hoc information gathering), development (‘special’ 
umuganda, ubudehe schemes, imihigo contracts, sensitization sessions), politics 
(imisanzu or contributions), justice (attendance at gacaca hearings, acting as 
inyangamugayo judge). Importantly, the platforms cannot be reduced to the 
official manning of administrative posts. The true ‘extent’ of the state might be 
hard to gauge as it overspills its official structures into multiple responsibilities 
carried out on its behalf, some established (such as the abakangurambaga 
figures or amarondo patrols), others ad-hoc (such as when someone is tasked 
with ‘keeping an eye’ and reporting on the whereabouts of a person).  
 
Naturally, the true extent of surveillance cannot be captured in a sum of formal 
and informal institutions and responsibilities, as it is more diffuse. The structure 
of information gathering certainly plays a role in creating a more generalized 
sense of ‘being monitored.’ As an informant told Susan Thomson in a life history 
interview ‘there are a lot of people watching you, checking on your actions and 
the people you are with’ (2013:123). Rwandans ‘all know of state surveillance’ 
(ibid: 124). ‘Dense networks of spies are known to exist throughout Rwanda 
(and abroad) and the Department of Military Intelligence is rumored to pay for 
valid information’ (ibid). The word ‘spy’ however might not capture the diversity 
of informer types, and the dynamics of often ad-hoc informants or people in a 
variety of functions asked to keep ‘tabs,’ to ‘figure out’ people (in this sense 
‘sorting’ and categorizing political character- e.g. What does the person think of 
the government, is it a friend or foe)?  
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Researchers are not exempt from this dynamic and they too attract curiosity and 
careful observation. In my own experience, I have been asked to produce a list 
and schedule of interviews, and have been explained that if I do not produce a 
particular report reflecting on my stay, the government might think ‘there is 
something confidential [I am hiding].’ Like everyone else, I had to deploy my own 
wits and resources in interacting with surveillance, engaging but also subverting 
it at the same time. Once we focus on lived experiences of surveillance, we 
quickly see that studying structures, institutions, even systems is insufficient 
since surveillance works indirectly, inspiring anxiety, carefulness and an 
atmosphere of ‘quiet insecurity’ (Grant 2015). This is governance through social 
unease – an insecure government creating an insecure society, even if 
paradoxically through its techniques of ‘ascertaining.’ 
 
In sum, while the political history of Rwanda over the past century has been 
undoubtedly tumultuous, the intricate state administration stands out as a 
constant on the political landscape, repeatedly re-appropriated as a valuable 
asset by the reigning authorities of the land. While at the top, political change 
might seem profound, on the hills, state presence and its exactions form an 
important continuity.  The presence of the state is a constant in the lives of 
common Rwandans.  
 
During the pre-colonial and colonial times, the main tasks of the state were 
extractive and (later) ‘developmental’ though the two can hardly be dissociated 
as construction of roads or drying up of marshes itself depended on labor 
prestation. After independence, state presence and role extended to political 
‘mobilisation’ of the population and to ‘checking’ of loyalties and leanings – 
whether it was checking of Parmehutu card ownership under the 1st Republic, or 
kubohoza political ‘liberation’ descents on households during the multi-party era 
of the 2nd Republic (1990-1994), or the checking of membership in the 
umuryango (family, ref. to the RPF party) today.  
 
The pinnacle of conflation between the state and the political project was 
undoubtedly the genocide, where local state structures were directly implicated 
in the project. But yet again, the genocide should be read as a continuity rather 
than discontinuity. The call to participate was couched in the same terms as the 
exactions and public tasks of the state have been in previous decades—as 
communal labor, ‘special’ umuganda, as public work (gukora, akazi or akazi 
gakomeye – a big job) (Hintjens 1999: 268; Article 19 1996: 15).  
 
The continuities in everyday state presence pre- and post-genocide are also 
striking (see also Thomson and Desrosiers 2011). This is especially so 
considering the stark change in the dominant class, its negative rhetorical 
attitude to the previous regime, and its emphasis on discontinuity, rupture and 
‘rebirth’ of Rwanda. Yet the continuities appear time and again, being symbolised 
not only by the nyumbakumi (which was abolished only very recently), the 
umuganda community works, the amarondo (informal night patrols), the 
animateurs (re-named abakangurambaga) or more broadly, the continued 
conflation of party and state, but also the state’s developmental orientation, and 
as later sections will show, by the ID card and other forms of ever more 
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sophisticated civil registration, and various informal but state-initiated activities 
and forms of state appropriation of time, labor and loyalties. The continued and 
increasing state reach and presence, and hence visibility, can be explained by the 
ambiguity that surrounds them and that derives from the ability of the state and 
its “mundane sights” to present a face of both care and coercion, its ability to 
nurture life (as in healthcare outreach for example) or to suppress it (as in the 
genocide). 
 
 
4. Identification: Counting, Sorting, Tracing  
 
While forms of oral identification (and hence social ‘tracing’ and ‘placing’) 
existed in pre-colonial Rwanda (see e.g. Nyirubugara 2013), it was undoubtedly 
the colonial government that has devised and imprinted upon its colonies a 
distinct bureaucratic form of identification, where identification became 
standardised, identity legible in a particular way and actable-upon by the 
centralised state. Considering the prominence of the ID card in accounts of the 
implementation of the Rwandan genocide, it is striking how little is yet known 
and written about the purposes and actual colonial implementation of the 
census, the card or the passport.  
 
The urge to sort, count and trace the Rwandan population came as a result of a 
wider colonial policy during the Belgian rule (1923-1962). In 1933, the official 
colonial bulletin (Bulletin Officiel du Congo-Belge) published a decree setting out 
the legal basis for identity cards in the Belgian Congo and ‘neighbouring colonies’ 
(referring to Ruanda-Urundi). It stated that all ‘indigenous’ subjects should 
register and would receive an identity card upon registration (certificat d'identité 
or eenzelvigheisbewijs). The decree did not offer specifications on the design of 
the card or the process of registration, these details being instead the 
prerogative of the governor of the two colonies (vanBrakel and vanKerckhoven 
2014:8).  
 
In Rwanda, the ID card or indangamuntu became best known for creating a fixed 
record of ethnic identity. Indeed, the very first item under the photo was ubwoko 
and the card offered four options— Hutu, Tutsi, Twa and Naturalisé—with the 
issuer crossing out options that did not apply. Nonetheless, it would perhaps be a 
history read backwards if we suggested that ethnic registration was the card’s 
primary aim. ‘Rather, registering ethnicity was merely one component of a 
broader program to increase the regulation of Belgian subjects’ (Longman 
2001:353).  
 
At the colonial twilight in the 1950s, Rwanda and Burundi had a ‘more or less 
well-functioning civil registration systems’ (Uvin 2002: 152) originally overseen 
by the Catholic Church. The identity cards were introduced together with other 
social monitoring mechanisms— a passport (passport de mutation, to regulate 
movement outside and inside the colonies) and a census (Reyntjens 1985). The 
politicised nature of ‘counting’ is easy to make out and Uvin (2002: 148) has 
shown ‘the extent to which this simple act [was] linked to dynamics of power 
and resistance in the region.’  Colonial counting was tied to taxation, and 
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repeated counting showing population growth was tied to legitimisation of the 
colonial enterprise, a token of its ‘benefits.’ The first full national door-to-door 
survey took place only in 1978 when ‘for 24 hours, no citizen was allowed to 
leave home and throughout the country, a whole army of teachers and 
bureaucrats, accompanied by military personnel went house to house collecting 
data on 36 variables’ (Uvin 2002:153).  
 
Despite the meticulousness and effort expended, the visibilising technique of the 
census was used to hide unsavoury facts—power was sourced equally through 
visibility and invisibility. In both Burundi and Rwanda, major violent episodes 
and exodus of populations did not register on the census. In the case of Burundi, 
this was the 1972 genocide, estimated to have killed between 100,000 and 
150,000 Hutu. In the case of Rwanda, it was the 1962/63 Tutsi purges that were 
secreted away, purges which precipitated the flight of between 40%-70% of the 
Tutsi population, most of which did not return until decades later. Censuses thus 
perhaps best show the fuzzy line between visibility and invisibility in the 
exercise of power, dissolving what is seen and what is hidden, shown and 
concealed into a ‘zone of indistinction’ (Agamben 1998).   
 
What is significant is thus not only the institution of the card by the Belgians, but 
the subsequent decision by the post-colonial authorities to retain it. The ID cards 
gained a more explicit political character at the end of colonial rule when 
tensions in the country ran high. In the ‘Hutu Manifesto’ of March 24, 1957, the 
authorities expressed clearly that ‘we are opposed vigorously, at least for the 
moment, to the suppression in the official or private identity papers of the 
mention of ‘muhutu’, ‘mututsi’, ‘mutwa.’ The suppression could create a risk of 
preventing the statistical law from establishing the reality of facts [i.e. the 
numerical dominance of the Hutu].’viii  
 
The firstix President of Rwanda Gregoire Kayibanda kept the card and so did his 
successor Juvenal Habyarimana, whose death precipitated the genocide. In 1990, 
another time of political turmoil, the ID card again featured in political rhetoric, 
and this time its future was in question. At the turn of the decade, the 
government came under a mix of pressures. In October 1990, the exiled Tutsi-
based RPF invaded Rwanda on a platform of ethnic unity. On November 13, 1990 
under foreign pressure, Habyarimana announced a new multi-party system 
along with ‘his intention, which he never acted upon, to abolish the ethnic 
identity cards’ (Fussell 2004: 65). If read in its historical context, this perplexing 
promise is easily understood as a political manouver, political rhetoric adjusting 
to the political platform of the invading RPF, and a liberal concession to the 
international community, sending the expected signals. 
 
Soon after the ID has been introduced by the colonial administration, the limits 
of registering identity became apparent. The ingangamuntu or in popular 
parlance les pièces (documents) became susceptible to the ‘age-old faking and 
forging practices’ prevalent elsewhere (Breckenridge 2005a: 98, writing on 
South Africa). Visibility is never a complete trap and one can in fact ‘hide’ behind 
visibility as we have seen with the census— here, however, the hiding was 
attempted by those subjected to the sorting and tracing exercise. The trends in 
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reclassification followed the changing political fortunes of different ethnic 
groups.  
 
During the colonial period, a trade in ID cards developed and Hutu who wanted 
to gain better opportunities and could afford the purchase, reclassified as Tutsi 
‘generally through illicit means’ (Longman 2001:353). Following the muyaga, the 
violent winds of the 1959 ‘Social Revolution’ and the institution of the 1st 
Republic under Hutu majority rule, Tutsi fearing persecution or discrimination 
attempted to purchase new ‘Hutu’ identity cards. Successful re-classification was 
not automatic, however, and hinged on the knowledge embedded in the 
community. A successful assumption of a new identity was more likely for those 
who relocated elsewhere in Rwanda, and more likely for those moving to urban 
areas with greater possibility of anonymity.    
 
After its use in the genocide, the ID cards together with the checkpoint became 
the emblems of a state and its bureaucracy turning against its own citizens, 
visibility and order enabling sorting for selective annihilation. Indeed, those who 
produced cards reading ‘Tutsi’ were usually executed immediately. At times, 
cards of victims were collected for accounting purposes, thus further 
highlighting the bureaucratic nature of the task (Fussell 2004). Captain 
Oldephonse Nizeyimana for example ‘regularly received cards from his men as 
they reported on the progress of the killings[…] In the captain’s absence, his wife 
received the cards’ (ibid: rf 15). 
 
Yet even during the genocide, people did not cease to invent ways to subvert the 
visibility imposed by the card, in fact using the document itself to escape death. 
One woman testified to have used methyl alcohol to erase the marks in the ID 
papers of her friend and to successfully reclassify her as ‘Hutu’ (Pottier 2004). In 
other instances, authorities themselves allegedly have used their power to issue 
false Hutu IDs and laissez-passers, as well as blank documents, and to make false 
entries in the Registre des Résidents to ‘selectively’ save a small number of Tutsi, 
even as they aided and abetted the broader project of genocide.x  
 
Due to historical manipulation and forgery, the counterfeit ID was ‘not so secret 
after all’ (Nardone 2010)— IDs were not considered reliable and were not fully 
trusted as indexes of difference. The label ‘Hutu’ was not a salvation. Its worth 
was eroded and it became harder to hide within the visible. The preoccupation 
with wiping out a whole category of people meant that ibiymanyi (hybrids) and 
abaguze ubwoko (ethnic cheaters) were also targeted (Eltringham 2004). The 
latter term was in use already in 1973, but categorical purity became a true 
preoccupation at the extremist Kangura newspaper at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Chretien 1995:102). In the November 1990 edition (no4: pp20-21), an author 
asked rhetorically: ‘A person that adopts an ethnic identity, which is not that of 
their birth and who carries the supporting documents, is this not a species with 
two heads (espèce à deux têtes)?’ The allusion was to a burrowing snake known 
as ikirumirahabiri, an image used to characterize ambiguous persons, and in 
political context meaning a ‘double agent.’xi 
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As a result, alternative ways of identification were deployed by the killers, most 
prominently ‘body maps’ (Malkki 1995) or rumored narratives of ‘real origin’ – 
histories of migration and subsequent re-classification. Small children did not 
carry ID cards and, when wondering alone, were better able to hide and pass 
through roadblocks. However, ‘survival often depended entirely on the decisions 
made by the individual militia on the roadblock. “I passed a roadblock and the 
men looked at the lines on the palms of my hands, they decided that the lines did 
not show that I was a Tutsi and so I was allowed to pass’’ ‘(Bleach 2009:69). 
More generally, those officially classified as Hutu but who looked Tutsi were 
targeted.  
 
Playing off the symbolism of the ‘deadly’ ethnic ID card, the post-genocide 
government instituted a new de-ethnicised indangamuntu in 1996, which soon 
came to be read as a symbol of the nation-building effort. The underlying issue – 
registration and its facilitation of tracing, sorting and targeting— was never 
problematized in itself. In fact, the system of identification became much 
stronger than previously. In 2009, new digital ID cards were released and the 
brand-new National Identification Agency (NIDA) (established in 2011) has now 
issued cards to 80% of the population using biometric information (WB 2014:3). 
The government is considering issuing identification for children (ibid).  
 
Not only was ethnicity treated as the key issue at stake, its lack was seen as truly 
emblematic, symbolically potent—the state might not have been changed 
structurally but rather recaptured for the purpose of benevolent ‘care.’ ‘De-
ethnicisation’ became a powerful legitimator in upholding state ‘reading’ and 
tracing for biopolitical ends, reaching in the name of fostering wellbeing and 
national development. The census no longer tracked ethnicity, and neither did 
any official documents. Nonetheless, this hardly spelled an end to ‘ethnic tracing’ 
as age-old and new alternatives continue to be deployed, including ‘body maps,’ 
family names and personal information on CVs.xii Similarly, the new ID card did 
not signal an end to official social sorting and implicit ethnicisation (Burnet 
2012). Importantly though, ethnicity post-genocide is not the key category to be 
‘sorted’ out by those in power. Today, it is political sorting that is most 
important, and to this end cards and registers have to be complemented by other 
forms of information tracing explored in the sections below and above.  
  
Just as during colonial times, the indangamuntu came to be complemented by 
other cards such as the umuganda card, the mutuelle de santé card (health 
insurance) or the Umurenge Sacco cards (savings collective). All of these serve as 
a mechanism to oversee compliance – participation in state-mandated 
activities— and as a control mechanism— a prerequisite to obtaining other 
permits and favors from the local authorities (Purdeková 2015). The most potent 
of these mechanisms, however, are the imihigo contracts. Introduced in 2006, 
imihigo is an annual pledge of accomplishment of specific development goals 
signed at all administrative levels, all the way down to the level of the household 
(see Purdeková 2011a and Chemouni 2014). In theory, the imihigo objectives 
stem from local priorities, but in practice they are guided from the top. The 
district imihigo are elaborate, and comprise around 40 indicators, thus ‘leaving 
few activities for which planning is not reviewed by the centre. In addition, 
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ministries regularly keep an eye on districts through regular “descents” of their 
agents deployed locally’ (Chemouni 2014:249). But imihigo is not immune of 
subversion, even amongst those ‘overseeing’ its implementation at the local 
level. While officials lament that imihigo ‘ “is killing us, no one can escape it”, 
[they] may resort to data falsification to reach their objectives’ (ibid: 250). 
 
Importantly, the Rwandan state has made significant strides in integrating these 
diverse ‘pieces’ of identification and monitoring. In a recent development, NIDA 
has introduced and in 2014 started issuing ‘smart ID cards’ which now collate a 
wide array of information into one document. As opposed to the national ID, 
which is required for all Rwandans aged 16 and above, the ‘smart ID’ is optional. 
The ID integrates seven identification features, including ‘personal identification, 
details of driving license, passport, family dependants/members, social security 
(RSSB), health insurance and a tax identification number.’xiii This new technology 
rapidly ‘decreases the time they [the government] use[s] to access the citizen’s 
full identification.’xiv  
 
To conclude, the Rwandan ID card was a product of the colonial period and was 
undoubtedly seen at the time as a modern and universalised system of state 
control, with all the ambiguities that the technology implies. The ID card is thus a 
good example of a piece of a wider surveillance ‘assemblage’ (Haggerty and 
Ericson 2000)— a collection of pieces that can be assembled and appropriated 
for an array of purposes. It is one technology among others that can be 
configured as part of a broader, transitory constellation of control—of 
paperwork, data, population registers and census results, of tracing, sorting and 
checking systems. It is both tangible as a collage of objects, sites and moments of 
interaction, and more intangible as a general sense, an affective state.  
 
The analysis of IDs and identification again highlights the role of ambiguity in 
driving continuity and re-application. Since the Rwandan colonial period, the 
card too presents an interesting continuity across a turbulent political 
discontinuity, and is deployed in Rwanda to this day. Undoubtedly though, the 
thickness of social monitoring has increased post-genocide, with old (or 
‘renewed’) forms being accompanied by new forms such as imihigo contracts 
(though these too are rhetorically anchored in the ‘traditional’ past; see 
Purdeková 2011a and Chemouni 2014). Crucially, the analysis unworks any easy 
distinctions between visibility as a space of state power and invisibility as a 
space of subversion, showing that it is indeed possible for the state and its 
citizens alike to ‘hide’ within the visible. 
 
 
5. The Public Show: Activities, Ceremoniousness and Commensality 
 
Post-colonial Rwanda came to reproduce the legacy of ‘close public scrutiny of all 
spheres of life’ through a ‘network of controls’ (Hintjens 1999: 245). But the 
Second Republic of Juvenal Habyarimana (1973-1994) marks a further 
intensification. Rwanda became a developmental state (Verwimp 2013) that 
‘stirred the hillsides’ (deLame 2004: 295). ‘“Projects” of all kinds gradually 
spread across the countryside’ (ibid) and the state brought people further out 
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into the public sphere – and thus sphere of vision— through multiple new state 
activities, including umuganda public works, public feasts and animation 
sessions— a style and repertoire kept and elaborated to this day.  
 
If the previous sections explored the ambiguity of surveillance, the resulting 
ambivalence felt towards it, and the confluence of visibility and invisibility in the 
exercise of power through the tropes of reach and tracing, this last section 
focuses on display and disguise as epitomized by public interaction, by 
umuganda Saturdays or communal feasting occasions. These public platforms of 
obligatory, ceremonious, ostentatious ‘togetherness’ perhaps best demonstrate 
the state of ‘mutual deception’ between citizens and the state, and a mutual 
‘disarming’ through pretense in public spaces.  
 
The approach in this section further complicates surveillance as ‘seeing’ by 
investigating the public sphere as a sphere of vision where both sides arrange 
and frame themselves in response to the other, resulting in mutual deception 
and, potentially, a ‘crisis of transparency’ (deLame 2004). From this perspective, 
it is both the state representatives and state’s subjects that are ‘watching each 
other.’ Crucially, this too is surveillance as the different actors carefully observe 
each other, and ‘dress’ for each other. There are three implications that flow 
from this. First, seeing is always also reading (as in ‘decoding’), yet greater 
seeing does not automatically translate into more accurate reading. Second, and 
connected to this is the observation that what matters is not only that one is seen 
but that one is seen as. Framing can then be manipulated from above, but also 
from below.   
 
Lastly, ‘revealing and concealing,’ as deLame observed (2004: 305) ‘are two 
ways of playing on the same keys, of escaping any definition of one’s position vis-
à-vis society.’ Indeed, when it comes to the public sphere, display and disguise 
again enter into a state of indistinction, and the act is perhaps better understood 
through the tropes of framing and ‘presentation of self’ (Goffman 1959). From 
above, the dramatic (dis)play is one of a caring state, from below— of a loyal 
subject.  
 
The developmental drive under Habyarimana’s leadership led to the institution 
of multiple new public activities and new ways and manners of state 
manifestation in people’s lives. On February 2, 1974, Habyarimana asked every 
Rwandan to perform ‘voluntary’ community work for half a day on Saturday 
each week. Taking inspiration from Tanzania’s ujaama and Zaire’s Authenticité 
and salongo (public works instituted in 1973), Habyarimana anchored the 
practice rhetorically in Rwanda’s own pre-colonial past of communalism. 
‘Umuganda’ was the traditional stamp on what was otherwise known as 
‘Collective Works for Development.’  
 
But this was not all. To umuganda should be added public feasts and exaltations 
of the regime, weekly animation sessions (séances d’animation), public 
celebrations, sensitization sessions, and stylized gift exchange ceremonies 
(amaturo). Animation groups were organized at cell level for the purposes of 
political mobilization and met weekly. For the abaturage (people) the animation 
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sessions of song, dance and sensitization took place after umuganda. State 
employees on the other hand met for get-togethers every Wednesday afternoon 
‘to practice chants and skits in celebration of the Rwandan state, its overthrow of 
the Tutsi monarchy, and its rejection of the ubuhake cattle contract signifying 
Hutu servitude to Tutsi, and most of all to honor the country’s President’ (Taylor 
2005). These employee groups were also organized as cellules (and thus 
integrated as separate political parcels of the mouvement) and were sometimes 
called groupes de choc. They would perform publicly on national holidays, 
competing against each other in their official exaltation of the regime (Taylor 
2002: 143). The voice of the President was also broadcast for five minutes every 
day. What resulted was a denser interaction between people and the state. For 
example, in 1985 ‘the population of the commune has participated on average in 
four cell meetings and six sector meeting. To this should be added 52 days of 
umuganda and 52 animation sessions. Together, this amounted to in theory to 
118 encounters between the population and the authorities. …This number does 
not take into account ad hoc sensitization and information meetings. Finally, one 
also has to add official celebrations to this.’xv 
 
DeLame (2004) argues that the ostentation characteristic of the Second Republic 
and visible in activities such as umuganda served the purpose of show— ‘they 
were highly visible in organization, but not in output’ (2004:289). The 
ceremoniousness was meant to have symbolic and metonymic power, both 
reflecting political power and hoping to enact what was being represented. 
Similarly, Ranck has argued that the key aspect of public interaction under the 
Second Republic was performative, it was all about ‘the spectacle of the state’ 
(Ranck 2000:193).  
 
Conversely, Phillip Verwimp (2000 & 2013) has painted umuganda squarely as 
exaction and direct tax. Umuganda made an ‘enormous amount of unpaid labor 
available to the state’ (ibid 2000:27). Despite inefficiencies and evasion, there 
were physical testaments to umuganda’s output throughout Rwanda. Among 
other things, 145 identical commune offices were built in every commune during 
umuganda, and hundreds of kilometers of anti-erosion ditches (Verwimp 2013: 
8). It is hence perhaps best to say that both show and real extraction defined and 
define umuganda and other public activities to this day. The aspect of show is 
perhaps even more important today than before. Umuganda as well as other 
public activities, meetings and celebrations bringing people ‘together’ are 
presented as tools for community healing and as nation-building tools. 
 
Yet again, the continuities across the landmark of genocide are striking—both in 
the developmental disposition of the state and the style of ‘public togetherness’ 
and ceremoniality promoted. The term animation has been dropped and in its 
stead there is the ever-present ‘sensitisation.’ Umuganda has been reintroduced 
in 1998 along with the post-umuganda meetings and ubusabane community 
festivals. The exigencies of reconstruction, development and reconciliation have 
however called for the introduction of additional platforms of public 
‘communality,’ such as the ubusabane community ‘feasts,’ commemorative 
activities, and special public holidays such as Heroes Day. To community works 
have also been added community justice responsibilities in gacaca courts (which 
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have recently finished their work), policing and security responsibilities, 
multiple unity and reconciliation activities organized under the aegis of the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), ceremonious football 
matches, among others. 
 
The post-genocide era also saw the introduction of completely new platforms of 
communality. The vast ‘civic education’ exercise is perhaps the most important 
of them. Civic education commenced first through selective targeting under the 
ingando program (see Purdeková 2015, Thomson 2011, Melvin 2013) where 
hundreds of Rwandans at a time spent weeks or months in camps in different 
parts of the country, receiving lessons on history, politics and policies of the 
government, military training and lessons in ‘traditional’ Rwandan culture.  More 
recently, civic education was ‘decentralised’ and extended to the general 
population under the program of Itorero ry’Igihugu (The National Academy). 
Participation in civic education camps is mandatory and all participants receive a 
certificate of attendance upon graduation. In this case, the certificate serves as a 
way to check and identify compliance and hence potential dissent. A university 
student must present their ingando certificate to graduate, while government-
sponsored university students must produce the intore/ingando certificate to 
gain entry to university. 
 
The aspects of mutual play are clearly present in all of these activities. ‘Being 
seen’ is used in ways that can both acclaim and undermine the official. Being 
seen refers to attendance or token compliance, which can score credit or at least 
avoid cost (e.g. fines). What often results are surface-level acts that speak 
simultaneously of acquiescence and ‘hollowing out’ of activities from within 
(Purdeková 2015). ‘The most important thing is to be there [at umuganda],’ told 
me one of my informants in Kigali earnestly. Indeed, when most important 
aspect of a public activity becomes ‘being seen’ doing something, effort 
diminishes and often becomes perfunctory. But subversion can also happen by 
appropriating and playing with words such as when saying that one participates 
in public works by ‘cleaning their living room.’ The score of indirect and non-
confrontational ways in which ordinary Rwandans subvert public performances 
while upholding them on the surface through token or irreverent compliance has 
been recently documented by Susan Thomson (2013).  
 
If public voice is policed and rehearsed, then power is often reclaimed by people 
through silence (Burnet 2012; Thomson 2013; Rettig 2008). Purposeful silence 
is both a strategy against ‘reading’ and undermining of surveillance, as it is a 
powerful message of distance or disagreement even in the face of an intimate 
encirclement by the state. 
 
But it is not only ‘being seen’ that is a space of play and maneuver, but equally 
‘being seen as.’ Both are plays of appearance, but while the first relates more to 
‘making an appearance,’ the latter is more about ‘managing an appearance.’ The 
two nonetheless are closely related. The purpose of political surveillance often is 
to ascertain loyalties and leanings. Being ‘seen as’ thus refers to maneuvering in 
order to frame oneself in profitable ways or to avoid being framed in costly ways, 
essentially of appearing as a friend, or at least not as an enemy. The latter 
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dynamic is what McGregor (2013) described in the context of today’s Zimbabwe 
as ‘being watched and the risks of being seen as a traitor.’  
 
In Rwanda, the salience of political framing and the stakes involved increased 
with the civil war (1990-1994) and later the genocide, but continue to be salient 
to this day. The terms of ‘inspection’ might have changed, but the intense use of 
surveillance to ascertain a political profile have not. During the civil war and 
later genocide, the key term was ibyitso— accomplice of the invading RPF 
(predominantly Tutsi), a term as abusable as it was expandable (and expanded 
to equate Tutsi with enemy or inyangarwanda; Straus 2006; Purdeková 2009). 
Today, the terms of inspection have changed—the talk is of divisionists, people 
with genocide ideology, and more recently terrorists— but the continuity lies in 
the search and identification of internal and external enemies. It is this 
‘inspection mode’ that contributes to further securitisation and increased 
surveillance in post-genocide Rwanda. The resultant fomenting of uncertainty is 
reflected in public appeals to vigilance— ‘banyarwanda basabwa kuba maso’ – 
Rwandans are asked to be vigilant (literally ‘to be eyes’). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The recent controversy over the arrest of Rwanda’s spy chief and head of the 
National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) Karenzi Karake at Heathrow in 
June 2015 revealed a powerful paradox. Karake was allegedly visiting the UK to 
meet the head of MI6 when he was arrested under a European Arrest Warrant on 
accusations of war crimes. Soon after, however, Karake was released on bail 
worth one million pounds. The headlines’ exclusive focus on the Rwandan 
figurehead and the organization he represented missed a broader story. Namely, 
that those ‘paying’ for the release, literally, were meant to be Rwandans 
themselves. The same system of surveillance assuring control also assures 
extraction of ‘contributions’ at the local level (see Purdeková 2011a on 
imisanzu). In the summer of 2015, Rwandans were asked to spare a pound for 
the ‘Ishema Ryacu Campaign’ (‘Our Pride’) so that their spy chief could be spared 
from justice. In this manner, power literally sought to bail itself out. Importantly, 
it did this through its local and everyday operation, its presence and reach. The 
anecdote thus digs to the core of Rwanda’s indirect state of domination— it is 
not Karake or the organization that he presides over that hold the key to 
deciphering control and governance in his country, it is the local embedding of 
the state and its extractive apparatus.  
 
The history of Rwandan state’s ‘mundane sights’ is an intriguing one. Over time 
the Rwandan state and its oversight structures increased both in extension and 
intensity. There were numerous points of intensification across time, and 
colonialism presents but one relevant historical juncture. The three sections 
have tried to demonstrate the nature of ‘layering’ that has occurred as the state 
expanded its reach. The paper has also demonstrated and tried to explain the 
striking continuities across historical epochs, despite their claims to forming 
decisive breaks with the past, even revolution. The deep structures of power— 
as represented in technologies of surveillance or the presence of the state in the 
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local milieu—have remained largely intact. Instead, it is their uses that have 
shifted, multiplied and the platforms that have proliferated.  
 
The paper has analysed three emblematic technologies of surveillance. Yet as we 
have seen, none of these was or is unique to Rwanda. The ID card was introduced 
in all Belgian colonies. The nyumbakumi was a post-colonial inspiration from 
socialist Tanzania that continues to inspire countries in the region. The 
animation sessions and communal works were similarly present in neighboring 
countries such as Burundi. The introduction of specific technologies thus has a 
limited capacity to explain their particularly intense and impacting use in 
Rwanda.  
 
The analysis shows that in order to understand the intensity of administrative 
surveillance and presence, it is best to combine the analysis of political 
geography, the reach of state structures, with vertical integration (the capture of 
the state by a particular party is key here) and intensity of use. From this vantage 
point, what matters is not only that the local presence of today’s state has deep 
historical roots, but also that additional layers of objectives have added further 
layers of use and intensity to local state structures over time. As mentioned, 
extractive, accommodative and developmental uses have been later 
accompanied by political mobilization at the grassroots.  
 
After the genocide, securitisation, reconstruction, education and re-education, 
politicization and mobilization have arguably produced a more intense state 
presence in daily life despite nominal ‘easing’ in specific domains (e.g. 
umuganda). Paradoxically, it is the genocide that itself provided the impetus for 
further intensification. The prerogatives of securitisation, reconstruction, 
developmentalism had an important role to play, along with other facts— the 
continued conflation between the state and the party.  
 
As shown throughout the paper, social monitoring is a rich terrain to read for 
agency and subversion. But while people surely ‘are in a constant process of 
manipulating the measurements and categories to which they are subjected’ 
(Uvin 2002:169), social surveillance is always ultimately a project geared to 
manage society, making inroads in the name of care and control, order and 
security. The ambiguity surrounding visibility and vigilance, is janus face of both 
ferocity and benevolence is at play in Rwanda as elsewhere, helping the state 
structure remain largely intact after being implicated in mass violence, and 
gaining further in strength.  
 
The legitimacy of surveillance is key and depends on the precarious balance that 
needs to be struck between state ‘reach and overreach’ (Ingelaere 2014), as well 
as the importance of historical memories and narratives that inform the 
perception of state presence and overseeing—the fraught histories of forced 
extraction and obligation, the political motives driving responsibilisation and 
vigilance. The RPF-led state is arguably navigating a tight line between care and 
repression in its uses of surveillance technologies today. Despite the powerful 
developmentalist rhetoric and legitimate claims to extension of ‘caring’ reach, 
the current government does not effectuate a break with the images and felt 
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realities of a demanding and extractive central state of the past, quite the 
opposite.  
 
Is Rwanda unique? As highlighted, Rwanda is not exceptional in terms of 
application of particular technologies and yet it is in Rwanda where all of these 
and more have been put to most effective and intense use. Political geography, in 
addition to factors mentioned above, certainly forms part of the answer. But 
looking at a country with very similar political geography— Burundi— which 
has also instituted similar oversight systems, it is clear that this cannot be the full 
explanation. Those who have carried out fieldwork in both countries quickly 
note that ‘the Rwandan government dominates the social and economic lives of 
its citizens in ways that far exceed neighboring Burundi’ (Sommers and Uvin 
2011).  
 
What explains that similar institutions and technologies achieve different effects 
across countries? And are ‘mundane sights’ of the state deployed equally 
effectively for the purposes of violence as for biopolitical ends of care, or aims of 
social transformation? How do we best conceptualise the trade-offs between 
reach and over-reach? Further analytical work and comparative study are 
needed if we are to answer questions about differential implementation and 
impact. The current study has hoped to stimulate interest in such questions. By 
tracing inspirations and parallels to different surveillance technologies 
elsewhere in the region, it has attempted to highlight the importance and 
feasibility of a wider historical and comparative research into political 
surveillance and social monitoring in Africa.  
 23 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Appadurai, Arjun. 2002. “Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of 
Globalization.” Development and Change 29(4): 905-925. 
 
Article 19. 1996. “Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda and State-
Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994.” Article 19, London. 
 
Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1993. The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly. London: 
Longman. 
 
Bierschenk, Thomas and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan. 2014. States at Work: 
Dynamics of African Bureaucracies. Leiden: Brill. 
 
Bigo, Didier. 2005. “Security, Exception, Ban and Surveillance.” In Theorizing 
Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond, edited by David Lyon. Cullompton: 
Willan Publishing. 
 
Baker, Bruce. 2007. “Post-War Policing by Communities in Sierra Leone, Liberia 
and Rwanda.” Democracy and Security 3 (2): 215-236. 
 
Bozzini, David M. 2011. “Low-tech Surveillance and the Despotic State in 
Eritrea.” Surveillance and Society 9(1/2): 93-113. 
 
Breckenridge, Keith. 2005a. “Verwoerd’s Bureau of Proof: Total Information in 
the Making of Apartheid.” History Workshop Journal 59(1): 83-108. 
 
Breckenridge, Keith. 2005b. “The Biometric State: The Promise and Peril of 
Digital Government in the New South Africa.” The Journal of Southern African 
Studies 31(2): 267-282. 
 
Burnet. Jennie. 2012. Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory and Silence in 
Rwanda. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. Africa Works. Disorder as Political 
Instrument. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Chemouni, Benjamin. 2014. ‘Explaining the Design of the Rwandan 
Decentralisation: Elite Vulnerability and the Territorial Repartition of Power,’ 
Journal of Eastern African Studies 8(2): 246-262. 
 
Chretien, Jean-Pierre. 1995. Rwanda: Les Medias du Genocide. Paris: Karthala. 
 
 24 
Codere, Helen. 1973. The Biography of an African Society, Rwanda 1900-1960. 
Tervuren: Musee Royal de l’Afrique Centrale. 
 
Cook, Sudan E. 2004. Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.  
 
Cross, Charlotte. 2013. “Community Policing Through Local Collective Action in 
Tanzania: Sungusungu to Ulinzi Shirikishi.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Sussex.  
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i The paper starts with but ultimately interrogates and qualifies Michel Foucault’s powerful 
linkage, ‘the central role of visibility in his understanding of power and control’ (Gordon 
2002:129). To clarify key terms from the outset, surveillance here refers to state-organized 
systems, structures and sites enabling the purposeful observation of people for a diversity of 
purposes, only one among which might be repressive control. In the broadest sense, surveillance 
and monitoring make ‘society’ as a space of state intervention possible. Social monitoring as used 
here overlaps with surveillance to a large extent, but is more specific and refers to active 
observation with the aim of sorting, categorizing and extracting crucial data on identities, 
loyalties, compliance, and more. There is a complex causal relation between state reach and 
control on the one hand, and surveillance on the other; the relationship is not unidirectional. 
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Physical reach and extension of the state enables and intensifies surveillance, which in turn 
increases state ‘reach’ as intrusion as well as social control. 
ii Desrosiers and Thomson (2011) also demonstrate powerful continuities between the regimes 
of Juvénal Habyarimana and Paul Kagame, looking specifically at rhetorical legacies and the 
projections of ‘benevolent leadership’ through which these regimes built internal control and 
international legitimacy. 
iii This change in turn depends on key factors such as the nature of the regime and form of 
government and their ability and need to capture political space (mass mobilisation, reading of 
loyalties), political ideology (e.g. developmentalism), political geography (ease of reach and 
oversight) and stability (securitisation; ‘social hyper-vigilance,’ Vigh 2011; shoring-up of 
certainty in uncertain times, Appadurai 2002). 
iv This is Jan Vansina’s chronology, which carefully revisits earlier estimates (see Vansina 2004). 
v so much so that in certain places court representatives ‘chose their routes carefully and armed 
themselves well before setting out’ (Des Forges 2011:101) 
vi See Cook (2004) for reference. 
vii The level of nyumbakumi does not allegedly exist anymore though lower-level structures are in 
place and sometimes might even be still referred to as ‘nyumbakumi’ (HRW 2012; Baker 2007). 
viii as cited in Fussell (2004:64) 
ix Technically, the first (provisional) President was Dominique Mbonyumutwa but his term in 
office was very short (less than a year). 
x This comes out of a number of the ICTR hearings and obviously needs to be treated with 
extreme caution as evidence. See e.g. transcript of Case No. ICTR-95-1A, Trial Chamber I. 
xi Chretien (1995: 102) discusses this with regards to the Kangura excerpt. For a much more 
recent political use of the term, read a September 2014 article entitled ‘Who Is Monique 
Mujawamariya, Accused Of Forming Rwanda Terror Cell?’ 
(http://www.newsofrwanda.com/abanyapolitiki/24964/who-is-monique-mujawamariya-
accused-of-forming-rwanda-terror-cell/) 
xii This comes out from my own fieldwork, and is also briefly mentioned in Nyirubugara (2013). 
xiii http://allafrica.com/stories/201407211727.html 
xiv http://www.biztechafrica.com/article/minister-youth-and-ict-visits-national-
identificat/5275/#.VY299qUXzwI 
xv Kimonyo, Rwanda, Un Genocide Populaire (2008:261). 
